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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The FAA has been involved ir. the development and implementation of trairring programs for aeronautical decision making (ADM) since 1973. The first generation ADM materials focused on the development of an awareness of hazardous attitudes. The students we.re introduced to the subject of decision making followed by discmsions ofhazardous thoughts, error chains, and risk assessment. Training manuals were provided with ADM applications to student, instructor, commercial, instrument, and helicopter pilots. An application of ADM to multi-person crews was offered in a crew resource management (CRM) training manual as well.
The current project was composed of four studies designed to formulate a model of the expert pilot that could be rested and used in developing intervention strategies. Each study in turn contributed to an evolving model of the expert pilot. It should oe noted that these were exploratory studies, using small numbers of subjeers in an effort to define the areas of interest. Consequently, statistical tests and other procedures which may be utilized with more rigorous studies involving larger samples of pilots are not appropriate and are not reported. Nevertheless, the qualitative information obtained from these studies may be of substantial benefit in shaping our thinking about how pilots make decisions and in plotting our future course of research.
During the first study, pilots were interviewed to identifY and compile characteristics of the expert pilot. The responses to the initial questionnaire were compiled and characteristics of the expert pilot were placed into categories. These initial categories were skills, procedural knowledge, learning and performance strategies, confidence, and motivation.
In the second study, structured interviews were conducted with thirry pilots who mer our initial characterization of expert. From these interviews, a preliminary definition of an expert pilot emerged: "One who is highly motivated, confident (but nor overconfident), has superior learning and performance skills, applies those skills in a changing environment, and possesses a type of judgment described by many as 'magic' or 'natural'." Some pilots described the expert as one who becomes "a vii part of the machine and flows within the 'flying space'." From this second study, a new list of distinguishing characteristics was identified.
The third study evaluated the candidate definition of expert pilot in three types of aircraft from the general aviation mid-altitude flying domain: Beech P-Baron, Piper Malibu, and Cessna P-210. National Transportation Safety Board accident reports were reviewed for these three types of aircraft. Contributing factors in the accidents were used to create a realistic scenario with a set of seven flight events for use in a flight simulation type verbal protocol analysis. Characteristics of each of the events were pur in outline form under the general headings: knowledge, skills, and mental models, at three levels: novice, ccmpetent, and expert. After this study, themodeltooktheformofapreliminarymodeloftheexperr pilot in outline form with the following major headings:
knowledge, skills or abilities, behavior, and motivation.
In the fourth s~dy, the scenario developed in Study 3 was presented to subjects and their responses were recorded. The recordir.gs were transcribed and encoded into specific categories for data analysis. The categories chosen roughly corresponded to the major points of the model oftheexperrpilotdeveloped in Srudy3. Frequencies of subject responses in each category were tabulated for later analysis. Trends in these data indicate that pilots who achieved better overall flight results could be differentiated from those who were less successful in three ways: (1) they seek more qualiry information in a more timely manner, (2) they make more progressive decisions ro solve a problem, and (3) they communicate more readily with all available resources. Subjective analyses of the transcripts show that pilots do indeed have different methods and sryles for solving fairly common flying situations, and these methods are not related to the total flight time or years flying. These tentative findings are, of course, subject to verification using larger samples in more rigorous, controlled situations. Such replications using similar scenarios in flight simulators are planned which will explore more completely the pilot performance model parameters that these exploratory studies have suggested are important.
INTRODUCTION
The study of expertise seeks to understand and account for what distinguishes outstanding individuals in a domain from less outstanding individuals in that domain, as well as from people in general. The approach focuses on outstanding behavior that can be attributed to relatively stable, learned characteristics of the relevant individuals. The classical expertise literature suggests that aggregation of experience (e.g., ten years of full time work in a domain) is the single most important factor in the acquisition of expertise (Chase and Simon, 1973) . In most cases, no distinction is made concerning the type of experience the expert has had as long as it is acquired roughly in the domain of interest. On the other hand, Ericsson & Smith (1991) found several studies (Libby and Frederick. 1989, Gustafson, 1963) revealing that people with many years of experience in a domain performed only slightly better than those ju~t coming out of training. They conclude that the greatest amount of improvement occurs in training, not as a result of years of experience.
Building cognitive models using 6e expertise approach involves three steps: 1) Identifying representative tasks that capture the essence of superior performance in a specific domain, 2) Detailed analysis of the superior performance through several methods including verbal reports during performance of the tasks, and 3) Efforts to account for the acquisition of the characteristics and cognitive structures found to rr.ediate superior performances of ex{lerts. For a more complete description of the expertise approach, see Downs, Jensen, and Chubb (in preparation) .
In aviation the accident record shows that it is in the area of cognitive skills where pilots most often fail. Although general aviation can point to some successful attempts (Fox, 1991; Diehl, 1992) , deliberate teaching of judgment skills is rare. Crew resource management (CRM) programs in the airline environment, which are closely associated with aeronautical decision making (ADM) training, seem to be having a useful effect, but as'essment strategies are lacking, making it difficult to gage the effects with certainty. It seems clearthattheearlyapproaches to ADM training may have reached a plateau. The time seerns right for a re-examination of the basic approach to ADM and perhaps to propose new intervention strategies.
The objective of this research effort is to develop new models of ADM to provide a better understanding of the concept in the general aviation domain. From these models, new intervention strategies will be developed, tested and validated. The ultimate objective is safer general aviation operations. The present research effort consists of a series of studies to develop models of the mid-altitude general aviation pilot. In these studies the sub-goals are to 1) determine the distinguishing qualities of expert aviators, 2) assess the processes by which they have acquired their expertise, and 3) create a training and evaluation system to bring the competent pilot closer to the expert. Whereas most previous research on ADM has attempted to change pilot attitudes, the present study was focused on understanding the thought processes of the general aviation pilot. Through the use of several methods of cognitive analysis (performance analysis, expert-novice comparisons, and verbal protocol analysis), an attempt was made to distinguish the qualities of the expert and the competent general aviation pilot. Through this process, a cognitive model was developed. This model will be used to develop a new intervention strategy for teaching these skills.
The domain selected for this study was a subset of general aviation pilots who fly the Cessna P-210 (Centurion), the Beechcraft 58-P {Baron), and the Piper PA-48 (Malibu). These aircraft are considered complex, fairly high-performance single-engine and twin-engine (Baron) aircraft and are usually flown by a sing!~ pilot often in the most complex airspace and in all weather conditions. For these reasons, the flying task for pilots in this domain may be as difficult as any in civilian aviation. To add to the difficulty of the task, many of the pilots of these aircraft have other primary professions (e.g., doctors, lawyers, businessmen, etc.) and do not fly very often and, therefore, may not be as proficient as pilots who make flying their primary profession. These selected models of aircraft have more complex systems and generally fly high-altitude flight envelopes co;npared to most general aviation light aircraft (Lar.dsburg, 1992) . The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports of accidents for these types of aircraft were examined from the beginning of their respective production programs (Cessna -1978 , Piper -1984 , Beechcraft-1976 . One of the advantages of research in this particular domain is that pilot subjects are available who cover the whole range of expertise. Using the expertise approach taps into their thinking in such a way that many of the results may be generalizable to the entire general aviation pilot population.
Identification and selection of subjects varied for each study in this program. Subjects for each study were selected because they represented the segment of the pilot population being studied and because they had the level of expertise being sought. Some individuals partic!pat,'d in more than one phase of the experiment. This occurred when a pilot was initially selected for the initial and/or the secondary interview and had the prerequisite qualifications for other phases (e.g. flying time in one of the three aircraft representing our domain).
To accomplish the primary objective of this study, to build a model of the expert general aviation aviator, several studies were conducted including 1) literature reviews of the decision making, expertise, and judgment literature, 2) a series of studies using unstructured interviews, structured interviews, cognitive task analysis, and verbal protocol analysis approach, and 3) a modeling design effort. The model of the expert general aviation pilot evolved following each study, first taking the form of a definition of expertise, second, a list of distinguishing characteristics of expert, third, a taXonomy of expert characteristics, and finally, a model for creating the expert aviator.
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DECISION MAKING LITERATURE REVIEW Background
There is a very large body of literature on human decision making; however, mostofit is not relevant to the present study. Our review of the literature was restricted to those studies that support our effort to build models of aviator decision making. Our purpose was to determine what others have done in the field of aeronautical decision making and expertise in aviation and other domains and to build on the knowledge base in this study. More complete descriptions of the experrise and modeling research literature are provided in Downs, Jensen, and Chubb, (in preparation) and Chubb and Jensen (in preparation) .
Early Judgment Research
As early as 1919 (Henman, 1919) psychological tests relating to complex psychomotor reaction and atrenrion were used routinely during induced periods oflow oxygen in the belief that the results indirectly revealed certain psychological characteristics. During the later stages of oxygen deprivation, there were unusual emotional outbursts of hilarity or anger that many thought revealed basic aspects of the pilot's emotional life or personaliry. In 1921, researchers (Dockeray and Issacs, 1921) were looking at judgmenr as part of psychological research in aviation. In a study of the physiological and psychological characteristics of civil airline pilots (McFarl:md, Graybiel, Liljerfgrahtz, and Tutde, 1939) , evaluation of a pilots' emotional adjustment, temperament, and personality was attempted.
Both psychological and medical research were initiated during the First World War when many pilots failed to complete the training curriculum and the majority of casualties were reported to be caused by human failure rather than by structural failure or combat. The allied countries stressed different aspects of the flying task while developing their tesr batreries. The Italians studied perception and psychomotor activity while the French stressed the importance of emotional behavior (Dockery and Isaacs, 1921 ) . The British tests were concerned primarily with physiological parameters, but implied certain psychological correlations. For example, volition or persistence was judged in terms of the candidate's ability to maintain a column of mercury by blowing into a manometer.
According tc McFarland (1953) the limitations of these early studies in aviation psychology included failures, "I) to make job analyses of the requirements for satisfactory performance, 2) to develop methods of rating or measuring flight performance in the air for correlation with tests of selection, and 3) to determine how well the tests actually differentiated good and poor prospects with follow-up studies later in their flying career. Personal judgments rather than experimentally determined criteria for predicti:tg or appraiSing success or failure characterized the early studies." (page 39)
Pilot Decision Making Research
During the mid 1940s, the growth of aviation medicine, and the need for quick and accurate selection of airmen resulted in a considerable amount of aviation research. Numerous studies referred to "decision making", "judgment", and "pilot error" and implicated the lack of these skills in aviation accidents and incidents. Kelly and Ewart (1942) used scales on the Purdue Scale for Rating Pilot Competency which included both achievement and the intangible factors ofjudgment and emotional stability. A sample item to assess judgment was "how good is his judgment in deciding to start or continue a flight when adverse factors are involved such as weather?" The continuum of answers was from "extremely cautious," "takes no unnecessary risks," "rarely uses poor judgment," "takes some unnecessary risks," "takes many unnecessary risks," to "extremely reckless. "Kalezand Hovde (1953) reviewed the records of pilots and reported on what they called a unique psychological group of pilots who willfully failed to use checklists. They referred to this temporary psychological compulsion as an error in judgment. The pilots who were involved in the resulting accidents presented a long history of non-conformity as evidenced by their flight records. Occasionally, they were below average aviators in every measurable respect. The rype of errors in which these investigators were interested were classified as "pilot errors".
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The nature of"piloterror" was further investigated by Kunkle (1946) . The term refers to all the defects which a pilot may exhibit in all aspects of aviation, althoagh it is limited in that it primarily refers to accident causing behavior. He divided the topic into primary or "non-emergency" error including errors in judgment and secondary or "emergency" error occurring in a setting of tension and confusion associated with a crisis in some phase of fligh •. Of course, the seconda<y error may result from an immediately preceding pilot error. However 1 true emergencies were responsible for only a small minority of pilot error accidents. Kunkle reports that World War II piiot selection tests generally failed to predict those who would have pilot error accidents and that these tests were unable to assess an individual's judgment. He further implies that the problems involved in the operation of an airplane allow full scope for any of the various manifestations of accident proneness. Reviewing the accident background of pilots involved in aircraft accidents revealed a previous accident pattern in which auto accidents were indeed consp1cuously frequent. He concludes that there is a direct, but by no means rigid, relationship between past performance on the ground and safety record in the air.
Research into pilot performance, including decision making, continued with Henneman, Hausman, and Mitchell (1947) who studied Air Force pilot performance. In the work on printed classification tests for aircrew members, Guilford and Lacey (1947) report that of all the traits necessary for pilots, judgment stands out as being the most persistent and universal. However, the frequent mention of judgment for the pilot presented a continuing challenge to break it down into manageable components and devise tests for it. Guilford and Lacey concluded that the judgment factor was best defined by a work-planning type of item. Furthermore, items calling for relatively complicated estimates involving time, as well as distance and size, were significantly loaded with the judgment (actor while the simpler items were not. The inference which may be drawn is that the judgment factor is a thinking, rather than a perceptual or memory ability. Guilford and Lacey conclude that judgment was highly regarded as a factor and received considerable attention (with varying degrees of success).
The first research in judgment specifically applied to aviation is a study by Thorpe, Martin, Edwards and Eddows (1976) . Situational Emergency Training (SET) was developed for the US Air Force in response to changing the number of crew members from two (in the F-4 fighter) to one (in the equally complex F-15). The SET program wa.s intended ro tea.ch che pilot to judge the reievant dimensions of the emergency, maintain control of the aircraft, and to make a decision regarding how to handle the problem. This method replaced the traditional use of memorizing boldface checklist items and was reported to be well received by the Air Force.
Jensen and Bene! (1977) present a broad outline for a judgment training and evaluation program. They suggest that the literature outside the field of aviation should be used to develop judgment training and evaluation techniques for pilots. Further, they add that judgment should be divided into intellectual and motivational aspects to establish both training and assessment approaches. Roscoe (1980) states that individuals have a "preset, though modifiable, decision tendency or judgment capability." Included in this consideration of a "judgment capability" are the person's intellectual and emotional capabilities, priorities, self-esteem and pride. "The pilot who has been trained to assess flight alternatives objectively and act accordingly in all flight situations may be said to possess good flying judgment." If this is the case, then che problem becomes one of identifying, measuring, and training the skills necessary ro use good pilot judgment.
A review of research by Giffin and Rockwell (1984) shows preliminary work in designing and implementing a computer-assisted testing device for studying specific types of pilot decision making. Tests of a variety of candidate hypotheses concerning the style and substance of pilot resource management and decision making were us"d to:
1. Ascertain the role of pilot background, experience, and knowledge in problem diagnosis and decision making; and 4 2. Describe the problem solving paths in sufficienr detail ro permit the ulrimare development of various models of pilot behavior.
Giffin and Rockwell measured pilot response to critical in-flightevents (CIFE) using a computer aided scenario testing system (CAS) in a test of forty-two subjects with varying levels of flying experience. Subjeers first entered biographical data, r:hen cook a knowledge test of aircraft systems and ·operations. In the diagnostic scenario procedure, the subject was told that he was flying a Piper Cherokee Arrow with information on equipment and performance displayed. The next display revealed the nature of the mission and symptoms of a problem being encountered. The subject then had four minutes to seek information and generate a diagnosis. There were four diagnostic scenarios. When the time was up or a diagnosis had been entered by touch pane entry, the time history of the information search was immediately available to the experimenter. Relevant findings in the srudy included (1) knowledge was inversely related to diagnostic inquiries, i.e., knowledgeable pilots reached conclusions (right or wrong) more rapidly than others; (2) less experienced pilots tended to use a larger number of diagnostic tracks than did the more experienced pilots; and (3) pilots followed a wide variety of different search patterns during diagnosis. Berlin et al., (1982) provided the initial work for the writing of the prototype "Judgment Training Manuals used in a series of tests by the FAA. The manuals were designed to improve judgmental behaviors through a modified behavioral approach applied through instructor pilots. Five "hazardous thought patterns" were identified and applied using flight scenarios. The students were to learn how to identify these hazardous thought patterns and to replace them with more rational thinking.
A validation study using the "Judgment Training Manual for Student Pilots" was performed by Buch (Buch and Diehl, 1982) on Canadian Air Cadets. A select population was chosen from rwo standardized flight academies in Canada. In knowledge tesrs both control and experimental groups were found to be adequate and equal in skills and knowledge. The results of the experiment show that the experimental group receiving the judgment training consistently made "better" decisions chan the control.
Additional judgment training manuals have been developed for specific pilot populations in civil aviation. Jensen and Adrion (1984) developed a program of aeronautical decision making for instrument pilots and Jensen, Adrion and Brooks (1986) developed a manual for aeronautical decision making for commercial pilots.
Jensen, Adrion and Maresh (1986) studied the effectiveness of the application of the "DECIDE" model to aeronautical decision making. The "DE-CIDE" model of decision making is a concept of the cognitive judgment process consisting of six elements arranged in a closed loop system. "DECIDE" is the acronym for Detect change, ~stimate significance of chnge, Choose outcome objectives, Identify plausible action options, Do best option and ~valuate progress. The preliminary results in this evaluation in&.icared the model has great potential as a judgment training tool in aviation. The "DECIDE" trained subjects demonstrated clearer thinking patterns in diagnosing the experimenter induced problems during a simulated flight in a general aviation flight simulator. They also showed greater concern for the safe outcome by successfully landing the "aircraft."
A consistent conclusion in the majority of the aviation decision research has been the need for continued study in the area. Livak (1983) reviewed current literature and proposed four types of activities necessary for pilot judgment training. First, education should include a non-mandatoryjudgment training program for all pilots. Second, training needs to provide specific information and judgment skills required for a particular license or rating. Third, certification requirements should assure that the applicant possesses and can demonstrate sufficient judgment. And, fourth, there needs to be a rehabilitation c.Jmponent for those airmen who have been involved in an accident, incident, or violation in which the investigating official felt the causal factors were related to poor judgment.
There are numerous studies that relate, at least in part, to the subject of training and evaluating pilot judgment. Trollip and Ortony (1977) offered insight into real-time simulation in computer assisted instruction that is applied to aviation. A simple conversion of a classroom training program can ;:>rovide a program for computer assisted instruction (CAl).
Personality studies by Lester and Bombaci (I 984) and Ashman and Telfer (1983) correlated certain attributes with pilots. These stu" ies may be useful when comparing the personality profiles of pilots involved in accidents and incidents with selected profiles of the general population to determine if there are any particular similarities of perhaps neurotic or psychotic individuals. To date this determination has not been made.
Sorj._,logical factors have also been considered wirh respect to pilot error as found in the works of Urban (1983) who looked at the urban/rural differences of pilots involved in accidents. The universality of the problems encountered in aviation due to human error is evidenced in the research efforts in many countries outside of the United Stares. Ground (1984) found pilot-induced factors to be responsible for 69.3% of the fatalligh~ aircraft accidents in the United Kingdom from 1969-1981. The position was taken that accidents do not just happen -they are caused. A number of factors were included when discussing pilot error including; forgetfulness, carelessness, irresponsibility, procrastination. pride, ignorance and incompetence. An important overall characteristic of judgment-caused accidents was that these accidents seldom had a single cause.
"Pilot Error" in Accident Investigation
Due to imprecise past measurement techniques in accident and incident causal factors, new methodology to address these problems has recently been established by the US Air Force. Accident investigation can be a useful adjunct to judgment evaluation training, testing, and tracking. Therefore, some of the terminology and investigative processes used in the new Air Force accident and incident evaluations are discussed in this section. This information is incorporated into the framework used in the development of the Jensen Adrion Maresh Judgment Evaluation Technique OAMJET).
The dichotomy between training and accident reporting with respect to human factors in the Air Force has been apparent since the early training days. The cause of an accident may be classified as "human error", though no description of the type of human error is given. Was it failure of the pilots' perceptual system, lack of knowledge, physiological failure, or a series of poor decisions? The current work on devdopment of an accident reporting system congruent with current aeronautical decision making training programs will add greatly to the understanding of the human factors problems. It is this understanding of the nature of problems which cause accidents that enhances our awareness of the deficits pilots have in these abilities.
New guidelines are currently being established for accident investigation team members which include precise definitions, documentation and thorough evaluation of the "psychological concerns" as one of the areas of concentration. A workbook has been designed to aid in the standardization and recording of all factors involved in a mishap including the human factors arena. In this context, a mishap is an unplanned, unintended event that results in damage to equipment or injury to personnel. Mishaps are broken down into specific categories, antecedent events, maneuver, and the phases of flight.
As a team member in accident investigations) the human factorslpsychological specialist is directed to examine human factors including perception, information processing, attention, perceived stresses, fatigue, coping styles, psychomotor capabilities and training. A distinction is made between "technical errors" and "judgmental errors" usually involving higher-orde1 cognitive processes. Technical errors are objectively inappropriate individual physical or mental operations such as missing a radio call, inaccurate altitude or airspeed or improper switch or control operation. Judgmental errors are objectively inappropriate selection of a course of action constituted by a number of subsequent subtasks. Examples include making an approach to below minimums or accepting an aircraft or personal condition inappropriate to anticipated mission demands.
Types of errors. Morris and Rouse ( 19 8 5) differentiate between "slips" and "mistakes" as types of human errors. Slips are considered errors of action occurring during a well trained activiry. The slip is usually brought on by a distraction or a preoccupation. Since 6 these errors occur in well established routines, they are usually unmonitored. When they do occur and are subsequently discovered, they add to the distraction. Specific types of slips include habit p3ttern interference, perceptual set, and omission or repetition of steps in a sequence (e.g., checklist items being skipped, or repeated.)
A "mistake" rype of error concerns judgment and decision making issues. Judgmental errors are likely when more than two or r.i.ree variables must be simultaneously considered. They may also occur when an inappropriate solution has been successful in past similar situations and when solution options are novel. Poor judgment is considered to be the failure to realistically assess the significance and priority of information from the environment. Assuming adequate quality and quantity of information, the poor judgment is due to an anomaly of attention or anomaly of motivation.
Attention and Motivation. Anomalies of attention are the misallocation or untimely interruption of attention to a task easily influenced by fatigue o ·other stressors. The types of anomalies of attention include channeled attention, cognitive saturation, distrac- Workload and Stress. Workload is considered for investigative purposes as contributing to errors. Perception of the amount of stimulation as too little or too much will have an effect on the number of errors. On the other hand, Hart and Bortolussi (1984) considered pilot errors as a source of workload rather than a symptom. This viewpoint may be advantageous when reconstructing the sequence of events in a mishap. Thus, the occurrence of mistakes and slips add to the mental workload.
Another view of the mental workload involved in the specifically active and adaptive responses to the demands posed by a complex task is offered by Wiener (1985) . To identify rhe operational components of the central mechanisms involved in information handling and decision making, the subsystem components were distinguished. This enables a measure of the stress undergone by each subsystem. "Stress", in psychological terms means the active responses which are specifically adaptive or adjusted to rhe external stress which maintains homeostaSis. Psychological homeostasis is an ability to "cope" however intense rhe performance level rhat is its cost or stress. "Strain" is evident in rhe non-maintenance of homeostatic levels. In other words, under strain the pilot is asking to be overstressed. Psychological strain is shown by the inability to "cope" wirh the imposed load or stressor.
The breakdown of the system is as follows:
1. The discrimination subsystem is where incoming signals are recognized and coded. The demand (stress) placed on rhis coding system could be quantified in terms of the number of identifications per unit time. 2. The decision making (or choice) subsystem coanecrs the identification subsystem to rhe output subsystem. The rate at which connections are made for passing on the coded input signals is rhe measure of rhe response or the stress placed on this subsystem.
3. The output subsystem is the number <>f central output signals per unit time sent to rhe executive muscles for the performance of the task. The rate of output is a measure of rhe response or stress placed on the system. 4. The corrective feedback subsystem regulates rhe accuracy of the output. The operation is assessed in terms of errors made in performing a set r.ask, but error evaluation is more properly regarded as a measure of strain.
Generally, the measure of response to a mental task is restricted to only rhe output system as a measure of stress. A measure of strain could be taken at rhe corrective subsystem. One special category of internal factors needs also to be considered_ in this general model. These host factors include the phases of rhe circadian rhyrhm, time period (pre-or post-weekend, holidays), quality of sleep, repetitiveness of the task, change of shift, and relationship to meals. Drug and 7 alcohol use can be included here as well. These factors influence rhe psychological response and add to or modify rhe internal stress system.
Jensen Adrion Maresh Judgment Evaluation
Technique (JAMJET) Figure 1 is a derailed model rhat describes a series of eight steps in rhe decision making proctss. This modd is an adaptation of an eight-step judgment model first offered in a report for the US Air Force Oensen, Adrion, and Maresh, 1987) and later presented in Jensen (1995) . This model is specifically designed to describe the aviation cognitive judgment process. Understanding each step and how the steps are interrelated is important to the development of better prescriptive models needed for intervention development. The complete description of rhis pro" cess as offered in Jensen (I 995) is nor necessary here, For our purposes, it presents a picture of our understanding of rhe information processing aspect of aviator decision making thar musr be examined in rhis program. The blocks indicate the steps in the process and the descriptors on the right indicate mental factors rhat enter into each step.
A more practical model of pilot judgment was presented in me Jensen and Bene! (1977) report. This model had two parts: 1) an ability and 2) a motivation as shown below: (Jensen, 1995) Rational Judgment. The first part of good pilot judgment is the mental ability of the pilot to detect, recognize, and diagnose probleiPs to establish available alternatives and to determine the risk associated with each alternative. This part is purely rational, and ifit could be used alone (which is not possible), would allow problem solving using mathematical functions in much the same manner as a computer. This does not mean it would be error free; it uses information that is probabilistic and therefore, predicts outcomes that are not certain. In addition, rational judgment depends upon the amount, type, and accuracy of the information stored in the pilot's memnry as well as his or her learned cap;;.!c;!hies to retrieve and process information. To optimize rational judgment requires high levels of knowledge, experience, organized mental structures, and systematic computational and problem solving abilities.
Motivational Judgment. The second part is the motivational or bias aspect of judgment. The emphasis is on the directional, rather than the aspects of motivation dealing with intensity. This parr of judgment says that humans (and pilots) base their decisions, in part, upon bias factors or tendencies to use less than purely rational (as defined by society) information. These factors include immediate gratification such as ego, adventure, commitment, duty, social pressure, and emotional arousal in the form of worry, fear, stress, anxiety, and euphoria, as well as more long term biases such as risk-taking attitudes, and personality factors (e.g., fear of failure and defensiveness). Optimizing motivational judgment requires both I) an awareness of biasing factors and 2) a will (motivation) to suppress these error producing factors so that decisions can be made on the basis of relevant safety factors from the physical world.
At this time, the rational aspect of pilot judgment has received very little attention. However, there is much in the literature outside of aviation including stock brokers, livestock judges, and medical diagnosticians, indicating that this aspect of judgment can be taught. In each of the areas studied, judgmental training occurs over a fairly long apprenticeship program in which the trainee observes the expert making 9 decisions and learns by these observation. Rouse and his colleo.gues have performed a series of experiments to develop fault diagnosis training systems to be administered on computer (Rouse, 1979) . As mentioned earlier, one demonstration scudy at The Ohio State University Qensen, Adrion, and Maresh, 1986) has shown the effectiveness of the DECIDE model in teaching rational judgment to pilots.
On the other hand, the motivational asp~c' oi pilot judgment has received the bulk of research. Early efforts following the Jensen and Bene! study focusing on this parr of the model have shown that motivational training caa be effective. The model used in all of these studies may be called the attitude model or five hazardous attitudes: Anti-Authority, Impulsivity, Invulnerability, Macho, and Resignation. An awareness of these attitudes, that are found to some extent in everyone, can help to develop a more positive and rational approach toward flying decisions. Training studies using this model have demonstrated rhat pilot decision making improves anywhere from 13% to 100% as a result of attitude training (Buch and Diehl, 1982; Telfer, 1987; Diehl and Lester, 1987; Diehl, 1992; Fox, 1991; Alkov, 1991) . Impressive results have also been reported in rwo helicopter operational training studies. Petroleum Helicopter Inc. (PHI) and Bell Helicopter have both offered the attitude method of judgment training to large numbers of helicopter pilots. PHI has reported a 54% reduction in accidents after giving this training to their pilots. In rwo studies, Bell Helicopter reported a 36% decrease and a 48% decrease in accident rates after the training. Both organizations point to the judgment training as the most important tool now available to improve safety in helicopter flying.
However, attitude training as it is formulated in the original Embry-Riddle Aeronautical U niversiry manuals (Berlin et al., 1982) has negative connotations and its benefits seem to have reached a plateau. Alternative approaches are needed which focus on the other half of the Jensen and Bene! model emphasizing information processing. This new emphasis requires fundamental research into human decision making and m-,deling.
Expertise Research
A prerequisite to this project was a definition of the "expert" pilot. The current literature on expertise in · ··iation is rather limited; therefore, a review of the research on expertise in other domains was conducted as welL The full range of methods of analy~is in cognitive psychology and cognitive engineering can be applied in the examination of phenomena asso~i ared with a particular type of expertise. These include performance analysis, expert-novice compariso'ls, and extensive studies of single subjects. The identification of a collection of casks that can capture superior performance is often not easy. This study used a large number of tasks for the subjects studied.
Experts engage in a number of complex mental activities, involving the ability to plan and reason, that rely on mental models and internal representations. Charness (1981) found that the depth to which a possible move sequence for a chess position was explored was closely related to the level of chess skill. Charness (1989) found that expertise at the game of bridge was closely linked with the capacity to generate successful plans for playing the cards in the optimum order. Similarly, in medical diagnosis, many different pieces of information from different sources must be integrated. Since this information is not available at the same time, the internal representation of the presented medical information must be sufficiently precise to allow extensive reasoning and evaluation of consistency, bur also must be sufficiently flexible to allow reinterpretation as new information becomes available (Lesgold et al., 1985) .
Sloboda(I991) maderhedisrinction between "routine" and "adaptive" expertise. Routine expertise is the reliable attainment of specific goals within a specific domain. Whereas routine experts are able to solve familiar types of problems quickly and accuruely, they have only modest capabilities in dealing with novel types of problems. Adaptive experts can make an appropriate response to a situation that contains a degree of unpredicrabiliryand rr.ay be able to invent new procedures derived from their expert knmv!edge.
Expertise theory has been evolving since the late 1950's with as many theories proposed as there are theorists. Early research on decision making stressed 10 mathematical models that either measured decision biases or used game theory and economics. T caditiona! research evolved from two paradigms, formalist-empiricist and rationalist. Formalist-empiricist research focused on behavioral testing offormal models and neglected che cognitive processes underlying the subjects' decisions. The rationalist approach establishes a formal view of normative standards and accounts for reasoning in rerms of a set of unrelated cognitive mechanisms. Experimentally rhis approach demon;rrates rhe errors that rake place between the normative model and the actual decisions.
In an efforr to make the decision research useiul in context, rhe Army Research Institute Office of Basic Research Qohnson, Rouse and Rouse, 1980) , began investigating planning, problem solving, and decision making in naturalistic settings. These research methodologies focus on decision processes raking place in realistic, dynamic, and complex environments and their real-world outcomes. The naturalistic paradigm investigates the way people actually respond to complex environments targeting the functions that cognitive processes serve. Whereas decision biases in the traditionalists' viewpoint are violations of consistency constraints imposed by the theory or norm, the naturalists view decision errors in the real senings differently. The naturalistic approach emphasizes cognitive representations and processes, but as Cohen (1993) explains "evaluation of reasoning is more subrl' and demanding: no longer a cookie-cutter compar,son between performance and an unquestioned normative template. In the naturalistic framework, the reci· prociry between normative and descripdve concerns that characterized the formal-empiricist approach can be retained ... if cognitive as well as behavioral criteria are incorporated into normative modeling." (Page 50).
Moving from the theoretical to the applied research, Adams {1993), in a summary of the expertise literature offers seven basic characteristics of what he terms "Expert Decision Making" which ate relevant to experts in all domains. These are: 7. Perceptual superiority. Experts have the ability to perceive meaningful parrerns using the organiza•ion of their knowledge base. Pattern recognition occurs so 01pidly that it takes on the characteristic.< of instantaneous insight or intuition.
In his effort to develop a personality instrument to profile "safe" and "unsafe" pilots, Rodgers (1994) developed another model of the expert pilot. In his model an expert pilot is an individual who allows for few errors, possesses almost total objectivity, excellent 11 perceptiveness, and a tolerance for risk withour any tendency to pursue risk for irs own sake T~e experr pilot must rraimain the ability to compartmentalize and prioritize demands throughout the spectrum of situations from boredom (repetition) through total mayhem (the unexpected, unknown emergency).
The current study, though, addressed from the viewpoint of expertise literature, the question, "What does an expert pilot do (or not do) that an average pilot does or does not do?" Building upon the previous research, this study sought to develop a betcer, operational definition of an expert pilot, to delineate the characteristics of expert pilots that differentiate them from novices, and to examine the degree to which pilots who might be regarded as experts possess rbose characteristics. To do this, we accomplish.:d a series of studies moving from general, loosely structured exploratory studies to more tightly controlled experimental procedures.
The project was composed of four studies. During the first study, pilots were interviewed to conceptualize a working ddinition of the "expert" pilot. The second study consisted of administering a structured interview to thirty pilots who met the criteria of "expert" pilot from the initial unstructured interviews. The third study of the project evaluated the candidate definition of"expert" pilot in three types of aircraft making up the mid-altitude flying domain: Beech P--Baron, Piper Malibu, and Cessna P-210. National Transportation Safety Board accident reports were reviewed for these three types of aircraft and an experimental flight scenario was developed. In study four, the enrire scenario was read to subjects and their responses were recorded. The recordings were transcribed and encoded into specific categories for data analysis. All four of these studies are discussed in detail in rhe following sections.
STUDY 1 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
The first study consisted of a set of semi-structured interviews to begin the quest for an understanding of expertise in aviation and to determine workable terminology to be used with aviators in discussing expertise. From these interviews, three levels of pilot performance emerged which were given the designa-.
ttons o e ow-average , average , an a ove-average". To date, this terminology has proved useful in discussions with pilots concerning expertise. These interviews also investigated possible representative tasks for use in evaluating above-average performance in aviation by eliciting critical event scenarios from the subjects.
Subjects
The inirial semi-structured interviews were administered to 10 highly experienced pilots with an average number of years flying of32.5, and average total flight time of approximately 13,500 hours. All of the interviewees were flight instructors and six were also designated pilot examiners. These same individuals agreed to participate in future phases of the project.
Procedure
The initial verbal protocol analysis for aviators began with the questionnaire shown in Appendix A. This insrrument was designed to elicit responses from the subjects to aid in the establishment of working definitions used in this project (e.g. "expert pilot", "novice pilot"). The questionnaire was given orally to each individual pilot as a part of the interview and their responses were recorded by the experimenter.
The questions were open ended and participants were encouraged ro expand and elaborate on their answers.
Results
The following is a summary of the ideas provided by the 10 pilots in the preliminary interview organized along the lines of the topics requested: 
Discussion
From these responses several candidate definitions of the levels of pilot expertise emerged. It was clear from discussion with these very high-time instructor and examiner pilots thatthere is a need to differentiate between types of skill needed to bean "expert" aviator {i.e., mechanical skills, knowledge, and judgment). One theme that was repeated frequendy was that "farm boys often make above average pi!r r.· . l:>ut just because he can drive the tractor doesn't make him an astronaut." From our analysis of the semi-structUred interview results, the following definitions were developed: 
STUDY I INITIAL DEFINITIONS OF THE ABOVE AVERAGE PILOT
Has the "X" factor {Indescribable "magic")
In summary, the initial results of semi-structured interviews provided suggestions for terminology to be used in further interviews and in verbal proto.::ol simulations. Mter much discussion and review of other studies (Erksson and Smith, 1991; Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986) , we decided to use "above average," "average, • and "bdow average" as the three classifications of pilots while working with the subject-pilots in subsequent studies. Our abbreviated definitions of these terms were:
Above Avera.ge: Highly motivated, confident (but not overconfident}, superior learning and performance skills, has the "magic.
• Average: Adequate learning and performance skills to complete the task.
Below Average: Lacking in motivation and/or ·rhe ability to learn and/or p~rform comistmtly.
STUDY2 STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
The second study consisted of structured interviews with a different set of pilots who were engaged in instructing and/or evaluating pilots. All had experience in the three aircraft making up the domain. The purpose of these interviews was to investigate the cognitive processes and learning stratP.gies of the above average pilot in order to refine our working definition of aviator expertise and develop distinguishing characteristics of the expert in this domain.
Procedure
Thirty highly experienced pilots {average fligh~ time of over 5,000 hours) were interviewed using the Structured Interview form shown in Appendix B.
Subject responses were recorded by the experimenter. The interview format was again open-ended as in Study 1. Questions were added to investigate the motivational aspect of pilot continuous learning, which subjects in Study 1 had indicated was an important factor in above average pilots. The responses were compiled and analyaed.
Results and Discussion
The responses to the structured interviews were extensively reviewed for repetitive answers and statements across the participants. A strong theme and pattern to the interviews emerged leading to a preliminary definition and a set of distinguishing chc.racteristics of the experrpilot in this domain. The preliminary definition of an above-average or expert pilot is one who is highly motivated, confident (but not overconfident), has superior learning and performance skills, applies those skills in a changing environment, and possesses a ~vpe of judgment described by many as "magic" or "natural." In pilot language the expert pilot becomes "part of the machine and flows within the 'flying space'." The pilot expert in this domain is one who: Responses to the critical incident questions provided numerous examples of tasks to test for expertise in this domain including: reported gear and gear indication problems, pressurization abnormalities, aircraft control at high altitude in turbulence, and system operations (auto-pilot, avionics, standby gyros).
From these characteristics an expert aviator analysis was performed establishing abstractions abou< the tasks involved in· expert flying. The tasks identified were classified as skills, knowledge, and menta: models. Most of these components were found to be domain specific and included perceptual-motor skills, procedural skills, and knowledge about the domain and all related domains (e.g. weather, air traffic control, physiology, etc.). Other components may be domain specific, but also could be carried across domains in expert behavior. These qualities are mostly descriptive of the mental models and include motivation, judgment (decision-making skills), and communication skills. Additional traits contributing to the ability of an expert aviator to exhibit his expertise are those of maturity in thought and action, consideration of man and machine, honesty to self and others, and smoothness in control or" the aircraft. These qualities may be considered more style than factors in expertise, though the concepts were considered important by many of the interviewees.
Three factors were found to be important in distinguishing the «expert" pilot from the "average" pilot: I) their method of information acquisition, 2) their decision processes, and 3) their communication skills. From this we hypothesized that 1) the expert pilot will seek more and berrer quality information about the task at hand and will seek more information regarding the changing state of the situation than the competent pilot, 2) the expert pilot will make more decisions than competent pilots, and 3) the expert pilot will communicate more efficiendywith all of the potential resources for decision making than the competent pilot. Study 3 was then designed to evaluate these hypotheses.
STUDY3 EXPERT AVIATOR ANALYSIS
One expert mental model that applies to all domains has not been developed. The literature indicates that expertise is highly domain specific and that it is unlikely to yield a model that can be applied across domains. The literature on naturalistic decision making indicates that, in the acquisition of expertise, a rransformarion of qualitative knowledge organization takes place as rhe novice progresses to expertise. This suggests that expertise: in. any domain must be: taught as a series of steps leading to rhe expert mental model. Thus the structure of the expert aviator analysis may consist of three progressive acquisition phases: knowledge, skills, and mental models. The initial evidence in our investigation of the expert aviator suggests that the inputand output for the" expert model" is domain specific, while the process from novice ro expert is general across most aviation domains.
Following Ryder and Redding's (1993) process on integrating cognitive task analysis inro instructional systems development, in Study 3 a novice to expert progression analysis was performed on the verbal responses of six domain-experienced pilots using a 15 scenario developed specifically to tesr for the characteristics identified in the previous stage. T:1e analyses of each of the seven events of this scenario were established through close adherence to aircraft opera ring manuals, standard operating procedures, Federal Aviation Administration guidelines and rules, published training man..tals, and additional materials applicable to the task. The focus of the analyses was on the mental models which were used to establish performance criteria for each subject on each task. These criteria are not subjective evaluations of the outcome, but measures of how closely the subjects' encoded responses marched our model of the expert pilot.
Simulation Scenario Development
The scenario written for the project was developed after an in-depth study of the accident reports from the NTSB on the three domain aircraft. Accident> in the three domain aircrafr from the beginning of production of each through 1992 were reviewed. Contributing factors to the accidents were compiled into major areas to be used in the simulation scenario. The most signifi,;ant problems identified in these aircrafr were: weight and balance, fuel planning, system abnormals in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), suspected in-flight break-up, effects of icing, flight into adverse weather conditions, and controlled flight into terrain. From this list of problems we identified those that could be simulated easily and also would discriminate competent pilots from experts. The seven events rhar we identified for the simulation scenario were: 1. Performing a weight and balance assessment and checking fuel. 2. Landing gear abnormal on take-off. 3. Icing conditions during climb-out. 4. Hypoxia at altitude. 5. Unexpected holding with moderate turbulence on arrival. 6. Reported windshl!ar conditions on approach. 7. Landing gear abnormal on landing. These seven events were: then assembled into our experimental flight scenario. The text of the scenario is presented in Appendix C. Table 1 pusents =analysis of tJ•e factors identifying the progression from novice to expert for the seven scenario events used in the Study4 experiment. These outlines break-down the specific experimental events into knowledge, skills, and mental models. The outlines progress through three developmental stages with the definitions at each level being slightly different. The knowledge progression begins with domain concepts, rules, and procedures. It then proceeds to declarative knowledge structure, and then to expert knowledge organization. The skills advance from the basic necessary skills, through competent skill components, to the refinement of these skills. Mental models are the deductive framework for problem solving providing the structure for knowledge and skill organization and utilization in the domain. In the analysis of data in Study 3, presented below, we subjectively determined the extent to which each subject's behavior corresponded to the level of expertise identified by these factors for each event. Table 2 presents a genera1list of factors identified with aviator expertise in this exercise based on situation assessment, conditions, and prerequisite information specific to the scenario. Table 3 presents a new reformulated model contrasting the characteristics of the competent and the expert general aviation pilot. In combination these factors and models were used as criteria for evaluating the subject pilots in Study 4.
Event Analysis
STUDY4 VERBAL PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
The fourth study of the project consisted of a verbal protocol analysis based on the scenario and event analyses developed in Study 3. An experimental protocol, shown in Appendix C was established and administered to six subject pilots. These six subjects had not participated in any of the previous studies. The objective of this experiment was to gain further insight into the thought processes of expert pilots in an even more structured simulation scenario and to refine our model of the expert pilot in a form that could be tested in the next level of the study.
Subject Selection
The subjects for the verbal protocol ana1ysis were six volunteer pilots from Florida and Ohio. Subjects were selected based on their availability and recent experience in one of the three domain air<;raft. Most of the subjects were qualified in two or more of the domain aircraft. Although posting and word-of-mouth procedures were used to solicit pilot subject volunteers, all subject pilots were fairly well know to the experimenter. A summary of the demographic information about the subjects is shown in Table 4 
Procedures
A "flight kit" with the applicable charts, aircraft manuals, supplies, and equipment to "fly" the scenario was brought to the experimental session as shown in Appendix C. Each subject was given the opportunity to request all of the items he would "usually" take on a trip of this type in the domain aircraft with which he was most familiar.
The scenario used (described earlier) was designed to be as close to realistic as possible through the use of repeated, actual experiences of the first author over the same route of flight in various weather conditions. The weather information package consisted of printouts of actual weather obtained for the experiment on a particular day for the flight. The flight plans were consistent across the three domain aircraft, changed only to reflect the type of aircraft being flown. In each case the subjects "flew" the aircraft in which they were most familiar.
When the subjects came in for their session, the protocol found in Appendix C was administered, beginning with filling out the human subjects approval form. All other paperwork was completed by the experimenter. The experiment was conducted identically in all cases with the subject completing the experimental scenario, then completing the Aviator Questionnaire. Prompting questions were used when necessary with approximately the same frequency for all subjects. At no time were the subjects instructed to "tell me why" or "rei! me what you were thinking." All questions w~re either for clarification of a statement or to continue the session. The enrire process was rape recorded for transcription. All of the subjects were debriefed after the session and were given the opportunity to express comments regarding the procedure. The subjects reported that the process was both realistic and interesting.
The tape recordings of the sessions were nanscribed and then coded into categories for data analysis. Any statement that could not be understood or was not clear was not coded. The coding was completed by the experimenter with one subject also being coded by an independent coder to check for coding reliability. The coding categories were then refined and the frequencies were compiled.
Data Coding
The initial verbal protocol analysis data coding categories were determined from the aviator cognitive analysis as well as the expert aviator models developed in Study 3. After completing the experimental protocol, transcription of the tapes, and encoding of the tapes, the coding categories were further cevised to better reflect the information being presented by the subj .cts. The coding categories were as follows: 1. Total Requests: Total number of inquiries for supplies and all types of information. 1.1 Supply: An item requested by the pilot to be used on the "flight" such as aeronautical charts, calculator, flashlight, etc. is no little mirror to check the nosegear ... " 7.2 Experience: A statement that based on the subjects' experience, past or during the experiment. "I usually ftle direct when I go up to that altitude", "You would have noticed it wasn't pressurized as you were going up, I would have noticed that right away", and "the forecast, 2,500 broken, but being as it is down now, and it may not come up .... " 7.4 Error: A statement that includes erroneous information, such as "I don't have the minimums for the approach". 7.5 Readback: The repeating of a direction or statement by the subject. 7.6 Positional: A statement on one's position for instance, "so I would be coming in from the northwest .... "
7.7 General: "A lot of thunderstorms" or "! would have highlighted this ahead of rime ... " are statements that are not specific enough to fall in any other category. it was clearthatadecisionhas been made as in «I will come back and land, • or "Then it was down and I'd go back to Charlotte." 11. T oral Decision Making: This is the sum of the Statement-Decisional, Decision Process, and Decision categories for use in data analysis. The purpose of the category is to look at the total number of events concerned with decision making. 12. Exp'rt Rating: This is a subjective rating made by the experimenter ofhow closely the subjects' known flying behavior approximates that of the 10 characteristics of the expert aviator defined in Study 2. Although it would have been desirable to have multiple raters, only one was used. This decision to use only one rater refle::ts both the logistical difficulties oflocating other raters in the various places where data were gathered and the exploratory nature of this study. Given the nature of the study and the overall intent of identifying as opposed to measuring components of the pilot expertise model, the use of single rater provides a sufficient though certainly not optimal approach.
"
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Data Analysis Phrases, ideas and statements were encoded from the transcripts and compiled for the coding catego •ies listed above. The primary goal of the analysis was to show the levd of correspondence between the hypothesized model of the expert aviator and the data from these pilot experts. Specifically, the three hypotheses that were tested were: 1) Expert pilots seek more quality information in a more timely manner, (i.e. they irnow what to ask for and when to ask for it) than compet<:nt pilots, 2) Expert pilots make more decisions than competent pilots, 3) Expert pilots communicate more readily with all available resources.
These three areas were expected to contribute insight into decision making and thought processes as observed during the problem' ~lving experiment. The first analysis examined the number of statements made in each category by each pilot subject. The second analysis was a subjective evaluation by the experimenter of each pilot subject based on independent knowledge of the pilot.
Results
To evaluate the first hypothesis (information gathering) the type and number of requests for information or material made by the subjects was used. As shown in Figure 2 , Subject 3, and to a lesser degree Subject 5, have a noticeably larger number of informational requests than the other subjects. On closer observation of each individual subject with respect to task, these same subjects also seemed to ask more appropriate questions in each of the circumstances.
The second hypothesis (decisions) was evaluated initially u'ing the Decision frequencies. In this case, the data show that Subjects 3 and 6 made the most decisions. To provide a more robust score, it is useful to combine the three categories of Decisional Statement, Decision Process, and Decision into a Total Decision score. Using this T oral Decision score, Subjects 3 and 6 have considerably higher scores than tne others (See Figure 3) . These two subjects tended to verbalize their decision-making processes in much greater detail than the other four subjects. These subjects also used a rype of dynamic problem solving which helped to direct us toward our final model of the expert pilot (see Figure 6 ), including satisficing, feedback, and keeping their options open. To examine the third hypothesis (communications), type and number of statements made throughout the simulated flight were used. Again, Subjects 3 and 6 made more Total Statements (see Figure 4 ). All types of communication (verbal, non-verbal, tactile) are critical in pilot duties. The pilot judgment literature and cockpit resource management training courses emphasize communication skills as one of the primary components of a safe and effecti-ve pilot Uensen, 199 5) . Although the data fmm this study suggest that being able to verbalize the rationale for actions and a propensity for seeking (verbally) more information are associated with pilot expertise (as defined here), generalizing from such a small sample is clearly a risky affair. Further, other studies of expertise using other domains (Ericsson and Smith, 1991) have generally found th:.t experts are unable to verbali'Le the reasons for their actions because of the high degree of automaticity that has developed. The data collected here do not provide us with a means to explain why the character of expertise in aviation should differ from the character of expertise in other domains. The present results are suggestive, but certainly not compelling, and will be explored further in subsequent, more closely controlled studies of larger groups of expert and no-vice pilots.
"Expert" Rating
The second method for determining expertise, sometimes used in the literature is the peer rating {Ericsson and Smith, 1991). In this study an expert observer (the experimenter), who was also a peer of all six subjects, provided a subjective "expertise" rating on each of the 10 characteristics of the expert aviator developed in Study 2: Self-Confidence, Motivation, Practice, Focused, Situation Awareness, Information Seeking, Prompt Action, Vigilant, Communication, Sets Limits. Each of the subjects was rated on a scale of 1 (lowest) to I 0 (highest) for each of these ten factors. The elCperimenter used information known about each subject independently from the experi-24 mental data to make these ratings and performed the ratings prior to the experimental data collection. Table 5 shows how each of the six subjects was rated on each of the ten factors. A summary of the conditions considered in the expert model vs. rhe expertness raring is depicted in Figure 5 .
Although all six subjects were rated high in most categories, Subjects 3 and 6 were rated more highly than the other four on this single-rarer peer raring scale. These data tend to confirm the more objective -verbal protocol results shown in Figures 3 and 4 . As one would expect, there appears to be no relationship between the expert rating and either flying experience or number of flying years (See Table 4 ).
In this final study an attempt was made ro differentiate among pilots who were known to be above average using both verbal protocol analysis of a verbal flight simulation and expert ratings. The results suggest that one can discriminate among the pilots using this procedure.
However, an open-ended verbal simulation leaves questions concerning the use of verbal communications as a .measure of expertise. Although pilots are taught to communicate, and expert pilots do communicate very welt this is not the only criterion for pilot expertise as shown in the final modeL
The results tend to indicate that pilots have different methods and styles for solving fairly common flying situations, and these methods are not related to the total flight time or number of years flying. Subjects 3 and 6, who were rated the highest, consistently made initial, rapid assessments of situations and then proceeded to confirm or disprove their theories. The other subjects usually asked for some other type of information, or made other unrelated statements before handling the presented problem. Finally, these rwo subjects were far .more verbal and tended to talk in paragraphs while the others typically offered only one or two short phrases. Although this may reflect different personality styles, the content of communication from these two subjects was more consistent with the expert model than that of the other subjects. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The objective of these four studies was to develop a model of the expert pilot decision maker and to show how it could be used m develop intervention strategies to improve safety in the target population of midaltitude general aviation pilots. To accomplish this objective, NTSB accident reports were analyzed for the domain aircraft, the relevant literature on decision making, expertise, and modeling was reviewed, and four studies were conducted including semi-structured interviews, structured interviews, cognitive task analysis, and verbal protocol analysis of a simulation experimer..t. Following each of these studies, new insight was gained and modifications were m:lde to the model of the expert pilot decision maker.
The results of this series of studies suggest that expertise in general aviation may have very little relationship with flight time after a certain number of hours (perhaps as low as 2,000 hours). In general the primary characteristic distinguishing the expert from the competent is judgment. More specifically, we propose that expertise in general aviation pilots can be defined in terms of the following ten characteristics:
1. Self-confidence in his or her skills as a pilot, 2. Motivation to learn all there is to know about the flight domain and practices their skills constantly, 3. Ability to focus on the necessary task and change that focus at the slightest hint that a change is needed, 4. Situation awareness (flight environment, location of other aircraft, terrain, navigation, communications, wea.ther, ere.), 5. Cognizant of the machine including noise, vibration, and engine indications, 6. Vigilant for the unusual, abnormal, or emergency, and mentally makes contingency plans, 7. Mental capacity for problem diagnosis, risk assessment, and problem resolution, 8. Communication skills and applies those skills to each audience and situation, 9. Knowledge of his or her own limitations and motivation to keep a safe margin above those limits, and 10. Ego-strength to enforce his or her own limitations in every situation.
Based upon the data from r.he studies described here, and taking into account the large body of research on pilot performance along with his own insights into pilot decision making, Jensen (1995) proposed a general model of the expert pilot which is shown in Figure 6 . The characteristics of expertise in general aviation pilots suggested above might be described in terms of experience, risk management, problem solving and attentional control and aggregated into Jensen's larger, more general model of the expert pilot. In that model the major factors contributing to pilot expertise which subsume the findings of these studies are:
Aviation Experiences. Proponents of the expertise approach to swdying human behavior have indicated that expertise is gained through years of experience. They often say rhar 10 years of experience dedicated to one field makes an expert. Some have used hours of experience in flight as an indication of expertise. Jensen believes, as do almost all other researchers in this field, that it takes more than hours of flying experience to make an expert pilot. In this step he proposes that there are five aspects of experience that are necessary to fulfill this part including, number of hours, variety, meaningfulness, relevance, and recency. Many hours of flight in Ohio does not make an expert pilot in mountainous terrain -a variety of experiences is need. Experiences that have no meaning (e.g., boring lectures) do not change behavior-the experiences need to be presented in ways that are meaningful to the learner (e.g., experiences with sound, visual effects, motion-simulation). The experiences must be relevant to the kind of flying that is anticipated of the expert (e.g., in reams if for a multi-person crew aircraft). Finally, the experiences must be recent. Although some experiences remain in one's mind for life, most need to be reinforced periodically to be available for expert decision making.
Risk Management. The second step in creating the expert pilot decision maker is to develop risk management techniques. This step requires the establishment of a proper set of values consistent with societal norms (i.e., thepilotmustknowthesafetyexpectationsofhispassengers and company). It also requires that the pilot studies carefully all of the possible haza<ds and the probability that these hazards could affect his flight practice. I DYNAMIC PROBLEM SOLVING Figure 6 . Jensen {1995) model of the expert pilot decision maker.
Dynamic Problem Solving. The third step is to develop a technique for solving dynamic problems known as satisficing. This technique for solving illdefined problems, which has been identified in experts, consists ofbeginningwith a clear understanding of the situation and making decisions that have a good chance of leading to the optimum solution, always keeping the safest options open. Feedback from the action is used to gain further information leading to additional decisions. Finally, the optimum choice is made. The key is to make decisions that avoid closing options.
Attentional Control. The final step is to develop an ability to control attention so as to focus on the task at hand leaving all other matters out of mind. In conJunction, the expert pilot must also be able to 27 perceive the smallest indication that something else in the cockpit deserves his attention and switch to that matter quickly and deliberately .It means being able to put matters outside of the cockpit out of your mind as well. Finally, it means not allowing pressures to make decisions based on non-aviation concerns to influence you away from the safe choices for which you are committed Oensen, 1995) .
This model provides a framework for understand· ing the results of the current series of studies. 1r also provides .a rational platform for planning further studies directed at a better understanding of pilot cognition and behavior. From that understanding we believe will come new training interventions to produce safer general aviation pilots. DTFAOl-92-10204. Thank you for agreeing to participate in our study. This portion of our study will involve reading you a common situation you may encounter while flying your -----·This session should not last any longer than 2 hours. The background of this session is a flight from AGC (Pennsylvania) to CL T (North Carolina) for a business meeting. Before we begin, you will have the opportunity to request information, charts, equipment, and supplies rhar you would normally rake on ~n IFR flight in your . There are six different flight segments that I will read to you. After listening to the segment, I would like you to tell me in dr.tail what you would d.o.
The session will be tape recorded, bur as explained on the consent form, your name will not be used or kept with the information from the study. The responses and data that you provide is confidential, and no information associated with you or your responses will be released. If at any time you have a question regarding the srudy, please feel free to ask. If at any time you wish to discontinue participation in this study for any reason, simply state you would like to stop, and you rna:· io so without question. After the session, we will debrief in full and review the flight segments. Do you have~· y questions before we begin?" C! FLIGHT REGIME FOR SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT The following flight segments were selected from a theoretical flight from the Allegheny County Airport (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) to the Charlotte-Douglas International Airport (CLT) in Charlotte, North Carolina. This flight was to take place in the summer with marginal weather at AGC and deteriorating weather enroute to CLT due to a fast moving cold-front approaching the Appalachian mountains. The route of flight and weather pattern development were constructed to facilitate realism in the flight segments that follow. The subjects in the experiment will be given a prepared flight plan (IFR) and an opportunity ro make changes to the plan. They will be allowed to request the necessary equipment, charts, and other information they would normally have on a trip of this type. The background information given to the subjects includes a brief discussion of the flight. Supplies requested that are not available will be recorded as such. Decision trees and analysis will be based on consistent procedures and information from the experimenter/" air traffic controller". The available equipment a.'ld information is listed below followed by the flight plan, flight log, and weather for the scenario.
Supplies Available to Subjects:
Prior to starting the scenario, the subjects are told that the flight plan and flight log have already been prepared (including four hours of fuel). They are asked to "check your weight and balance" (there are four souls on board at 170 pounds each and 25 pounds of baggage each) and asked if they want to make any changes to their flight plan "r fuel loading. The tape recorder is voice-activated, so a note of the preparation time is made for each subject.
After the subject completes the pre-flight tasks as requested, the scenario segments are started. The text of the segments follow. Statements in parenthesis are notes for the experimenters' use only. "You are approaching the HMV VOR and thinking to yourself that it hardly pays to file direct anymore. You have been vectored all over the place, the weather is not the greatest, and apparently you are catching up to that cold-front as the ride is getting pretty rough. You have to ask your front seat passenger to hold your charts as they will not stay on the chart holder. Center calls with an a.-nendment to your routing when you are ready to copy as follows:
you are now cleared direct to the HMV VOR, hold NE on the 012 degree radial, maintain (altitude). This is for flow control into CLT. You read back the clearance and inform your passengers of the delay. 
